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I. INTRODUCTION
As Congress once again considers proposed legislation that, by its
title, purports to support employee free choice in union representation
decisions, it is perhaps an appropriate time to reconsider whether the
existing legal regulation of union organizing campaigns actually promotes
employee free choice.' This Article takes the position that at least one
longstanding and widely-cherished rule of labor law-the prohibition on
employer promises during union representation campaigns-does not
further employee free choice in union campaigns. Moreover, the rule also
fails to comport with the law's stated goal of neutrality in union-organizing
campaigns because it allows unions to make grandiose promises about the
* Daniel V. Johns is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame and the University of
Virginia School of Law. Mr. Johns is a partner in the Philadelphia-based law firm of
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP where he specializes in labor and employment
law. The views expressed in the Article are solely those of the author.
1. The Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1696, 109th Cong. (2005), would require
employers to recognize not only unions created by secret-ballot elections under the National
Labor Relations Board, but also unions based merely on union authorization cards signed by
51% of the workforce. The proposed legislation also includes provisions that require
mediation and arbitration in first contract disputes, and stiffer penalties for employer
violations of the National Labor Relations Act, including treble back-pay awards. For
conflicting viewpoints on the value of the proposed legislation, see the opinions expressed
on the websites of the AFL-CIO, What is the Employee Free Choice Act?,
http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/voiceatwork/efca/whatis.cfm (last visited February 5,
2008) (promoting the Employee Free Choice Act), and the Statement of the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, by Charles I. Cohen, to Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education of the Committee on Appropriations, (July 16, 2004), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/testimony/2004/040716employeefreechoiceact.htm
(follow "View Testimony" hyperlink) (defending the NLRB's election process and
criticizing the use of neutrality/card check agreements).
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benefits that will flow from a union victory in a representation election,
while denying employers that same right.
The prohibition against employer promises during representation
campaigns is so well-entrenched that it has become an axiomatic principle
of labor law: Employers cannot make promises to employees about the
consequences of a "no" vote in a representation campaign, while unions are
free to make any promises about the benefits employees purportedly can
achieve through collective bargaining if the union wins the election. The
rationale behind this rule is that an employer's promises are more coercive
and damaging to employees' rights than a union's promises, because
employees understand that an employer can fulfill its promises while a
union cannot guarantee any result. This Article examines this rationale,
concludes that it is flawed, and argues that any distinction between
employer and union promises does not support the purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or the "Act").
2
More specifically, the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB" or
the "Board") distinction between employer and union promises during
representation campaigns is based on faulty reasoning and a flawed
understanding of the workplace. Employees have an existing relationship
with their employer, but not with the organizing union. Employees have
far more experience with, and greater information about, their employer.
They are therefore better equipped to assess the legitimacy and value of
promises made by their employer as an entity with whom they have an
ongoing relationship and considerable first-hand experience. On the other
hand, employees typically have no experience with an organizing union or
its representatives, leaving little or no information with which to evaluate
union promises. Also, non-union employees likely have little experience
with the process of collective bargaining, the vehicle through which unions
promise improvements during an organizing campaign.3  Given the
disparity in employee experience and knowledge about the two parties to a
union representation election, it is counterintuitive, to say the least, to
prohibit promises from the entity with which employees have an active and
ongoing relationship, while sanctioning promises from an entity with which
employees have little or no experience.
Moreover, the Board's oft-used mantra in other areas of labor law-
that persuasion is not coercion-should apply with equal force in union
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2000).
3. In fact, only a small portion of the current American workforce has had any
experience with unions and collective bargaining. See, e.g., Raymond L. Hogler, The
Historical Misconception of Right to Work Laws in the United States: Senator Robert
Wagner, Legal Policy, and the Decline of Labor Unions, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101,
101-02 (2005) (noting that, by 2004, unions represented only 7.9% of the private sector
workforce and only 12.5% of the non-agricultural workforce overall).
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representation campaigns. An employer's ability to deliver on its promises
made during a union campaign does not constitute coercion solely because
such promises may more effectively convince employees to vote against a
union. Rather, employee knowledge supports the stated goal of any
representation election: more informed employee decision-making and
greater freedom of choice for employees in union campaigns.
Union representation campaigns are perhaps the only type of elections
that prohibit one party from explaining to voters exactly what the
consequences of their vote for that party will be. Instead, employees are
left to guess or surmise what an employer plans to do if it wins the election.
The union, on the other hand, can tell employees exactly what it will seek
(and purportedly achieve) if the employees vote in favor of union
representation. Such a rule is neither neutral nor helpful to an employee's
ability to make an informed decision in a representation election. Free
choice is aided by providing employees with more-not less-information
about the consequences of their decision.
II. THE NLRB'S TREATMENT OF EMPLOYER AND UNION PROMISES
DURING REPRESENTATION CAMPAIGNS
A. The Exchange Parts Rule
Any discussion of the Board's treatment of employer promises during
representation campaigns must begin (and end) with the Supreme Court's
decision in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co.4 In Exchange Parts, the Court
considered the legality of an employer's decision to confer benefits upon
employees during the pendency of a union's organizing campaign.5 The
employer sent a letter to employees several weeks before the election to
decry the "Empty Promises of the Union" and to state that the employees
did not need a union for the benefits that they already had, or to gain
"additional improvements in the future.",6 The employer's letter then
continued to list a detailed statement of the benefits employees already
received from the employer and an estimate of the monetary value of each
of those benefits.' Included in the list of employee benefits were several
improvements to the benefits package, such as a "birthday holiday, a new
system for computing overtime during holiday weeks which [sic] had the
effect of increasing wages for those weeks, and a new vacation schedule
which [sic] enabled employees to extend their vacations by sandwiching
4. 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
5. Id. at 406-07.
6. Id. at 407.
7. Id.
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them between two weekends."'  Employees voted against union
representation after an NLRB-conducted secret-ballot election.9
The NLRB found that the employer's grant and announcement of new
benefits was intended to induce employees to vote against the union. 1°
Thus, the Board concluded that the employer's announcement of new
benefits violated employees' rights under Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA. 11
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the
Board's reasoning, finding that the employer's actions did not interfere
with, coerce, or restrain employees' rights under the Act.' 2 Specifically,
the court held:
The argument that an increase of benefits by the employer may
persuade the employees not to vote for the union overlooks the
fact that the employer is entitled to try to persuade his employees
to vote against a union, provided that he does so by non-coercive
means. Antiunion bias, strong convictions against unions or
opposition to the underlying philosophy of the Labor
Management Relations Act is not itself an unfair labor practice.
In a free democracy, it is the citizen, not the Government, who
fixes his own beliefs. The right of the employer to make his
appeal to the workers is expressly preserved by the statute....
Although freedom to increase benefits in an effort to make a
union seem unnecessary does not follow as a necessary incident
of the right to argue against the union, it is scarcely any more
coercive. . . . The whole tenor of the statutory language and
decisions interpreting it indicate that the evil to which the statute
is directed is the use of force and pressure. Persuasive efforts are
not outlawed. Testing the increase of benefits effected by [the
employer] against these considerations, we feel that this action is
persuasive, not coercive."
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the reasoning of the Fifth
Circuit, finding that the employer's actions did interfere with employees'
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 408. Promises aside, the NLRB's finding is not particularly instructive, as the
actions of most employers during union campaigns presumably are intended to convince
employees to vote against union representation. Such a motive, in and of itself, is not a
violation of the NLRA.
11. Id. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA states that an employer's interference with the
rights granted to employees under Section 7 of the Act constitutes an unfair labor practice.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000). Section 7 of the Act gives employees the right to "form, join,
or assist" unions, as well as "the right to refrain from such activities .... " 29 U.S.C. § 157
(2000) (emphasis added).
12. NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 304 F.2d 368, 375-76 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 375 U.S.
405 (1964).
13. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
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rights under the Act and thus constituted an unfair labor practice. 14
Although the Court acknowledged the possibility that its decision, which
intended to safeguard the rights of employees, may have actually prevented
employers from providing greater benefits to employees, it nonetheless
determined that the employer's actions constituted unlawful interference
with employees' rights to organize. 15 With very little analysis to support
such a conclusion, the Court instead relied upon a now oft-repeated
metaphor: "The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the
suggestion of afist inside the velvet glove.' 16 Thus, according to the Court,
an employer's unconditional grant or promise of union benefits during an
organizational campaign is inherently coercive because "[e]mployees are
not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred is
also the source from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up
if it is not obliged."' 7
B. The NLRB's Distinction Between Employer and Union Promises
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Exchange Parts, the Board has
consistently found that employers' promises or grants of benefits during
organizational campaigns violate the Act.'8 Just as consistently, however,
the Board has found that unions' promises to employees of the purported
improvements that they will achieve with respect to the terms and
conditions of employment during collective bargaining are not coercive
because employees recognize that employers have the ability to effect
changes in benefits, while unions do not.' 9 For example, as the Board
stated in Smith Co. :20
14. NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405,409-10 (1964).
15. Id. at 410.
16. Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
17. Id. The NLRA specifically exempts a "promise of benefit" from the so-called free
speech proviso contained in the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000) (defining acceptable
expression of views).
18. The Board's decisions in these cases do very little to flesh out whether a specific
employer promise actually coerced employees in their decision on union representation;
instead, the Board tends to repeat the Court's velvet glove metaphor and to invalidate the
results of the election with little or no time spent on how a particular promise interfered with
an employee's freedom of choice. For example, in St. Francis Hosp. v. NLRB, 729 F.2d
844, 847-48 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court upheld the Board's decision to invalidate an election
due to promises made by the employer during a representation campaign. Specifically, with
very little analysis or discussion whatsoever, the court found that vague statements to
employees to "give [the employer] one year" and similar comments constituted unlawful
employer promises that justified overturning the results of the election. Id. at 852-53.
19. See, e.g., Acme Wire Prods. Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 701 (1976) ("Employees are
generally able to understand that a union cannot obtain benefits automatically by winning an
election, but must seek to achieve them through collective bargaining.").
20. 192 N.L.R.B. 1098, 1101 (1971).
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With respect to the benefits which the two employees say the
[u]nion promised, it is concluded that the statements attributed to
the [u]nion did not exceed the bounds of privileged campaign
propaganda. Employees are generally able to understand that a
union cannot obtain benefits automatically by winning an
election but must seek to achieve them through collective
bargaining. Union promises of the type involved herein are
easily recognized by employees to be dependent on contingencies
beyond the [u]nion's control and do not carry with them the same
degree of finality as if uttered by an employer who has it within
his power to implement promises or benefits.2'
The specific union promises complained about in Smith were quite
extensive and included:
pension and dental plans; elimination of home workers;
prohibition of supervisors touching machines; job specialization;
pay for the highest rated machine operated during the week, even
though the balance of the week was on a lower rated job; union
ability to keep an employee on the job even if the [e]mployer
wished to fire him, whereas in the absence of a union victory the
[e]mployer was free to fire; tickets for Frontier-land at a
discount; availability of a blood bank and loans from a credit
union; special discounts on tires, cars and appliances.22
Another good example of the Board's attempts to distinguish between
employer and union promises can be found in Lalique N.A., Inc.23 In that
case, the Board considered whether the following statement by a union to
employees during a campaign was objectionable:
Remember when Local 223 is elected on April 19th you will no
longer have to pay for you and your families [sic] medical
benefits. As a Local 223 member you will be entitled to free
medical care, free hospitals, free dental care, free optical care and
eyeglasses not only for you but for your immediate family
members as well. And nothing will be taken out of your
paycheck to pay for those benefits.24
The employer responded to the union statements by informing
employees that the union's promises of improved terms and conditions of
employment could not be guaranteed and had to be earned through
21. Id. at 1101; see also El Monte Tool & Die Casting, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 160
(9th Cir. 1980) (affirming Board order dismissing challenge to union campaign promises).
22. Id. at 1101. Clearly, such benefits constituted significant improvements to the
working conditions and terms and conditions of employment for the employees in the
proposed bargaining unit.
23. 339 N.L.R.B. 1119 (2003).
24. Id. at 1119.
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collective bargaining.25  Despite those statements, the union won the
election.26 In rejecting the employer's objections to the union's campaign
promises, the Board, with no analysis whatsoever into whether the union's
promises had misled or tricked employees in the exercise of their rights
under the Act, merely trotted out its oft-repeated justification for allowing
union promises during an organizing campaign: "[E]mployees are
generally able to understand that a union cannot obtain most benefits
automatically by winning an election but must seek to achieve them
through collective bargaining ....
These decisions result in the somewhat strange legal dichotomy
prohibiting employer promises of benefits during representation
campaigns, while allowing union promises to employees.28 This distinction
is so entrenched in labor law that some management campaign treatises
warn employers against debating union organizers:
Occasionally, a union representative will request the opportunity
to reply to the employer's talk or to debate the issues. As a
general rule, such requests should be rejected. A union organizer
can make promises; the employer lawfully cannot make any
promises, other than to give vague assurances that it will continue
to treat employees fairly. Since the employer cannot out-promise
the union, it may look like the loser in the debate.29
So, in. a system designed to (1) guarantee the right of employees to
both unionize and to refrain from unionization; (2) uphold employee
freedom of choice; and (3) preserve the neutrality of the election process,
unions are free to promise better wages or health insurance, a new pension
plan or some other enhanced employee benefit, while an employer cannot
make the same promise. As set forth below, the premise of this Article is
that the current distinction between employer and union promises during
organizing campaigns makes no sense and should be abandoned.
25. Id. at 1119-1120.
26. Id. at 1119.
27. Id. at 1120; see also Wolfrich Corp., 234 N.L.R.B. 525 (1978) (rejecting employer
objection based on promises of benefits made by union representative who falsely informed
employees that he was calling them from the offices of the NLRB and finding such
promises to be "innocuous").
28. Judge Richard Posner has commented that the distinction between employer and
union promises aids unions because it prevents employees from economic free-riding. That
is, the legal distinction between employer and union campaign promises prevents employees
from enjoying the benefits of unionization-presumably enhanced employee benefits-
while avoiding responsibility for the costs of such benefits, namely union dues. Richard A.
Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 988, 1004 (1984).
29. JACKSON LEWIS, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS 89 (4th Ed. 1997) (quotations
omitted).
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III. RETHINKING THE NLRB'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND
UNION PROMISES
A. The Principles of Neutrality and Employee Freedom of Choice
In arguing in favor of a system that treats employer and union
promises equally, this Article relies upon a simple premise-the NLRA
does not and should not promote unionization. Rather, consistent with the
statutory language, the Act promotes employee freedom of choice in
deciding whether or not to unionize.30 As stated in one article, the
prevailing view is "that the NLRA now does not promote unionization .. ,
but instead protects unionization only insofar as it is the employees'
choice."'" Put another way: "[a]ny procedure requiring a "fair" election
must honor the right of those who oppose a union as well as those who
favor it. The Act is wholly neutral when it comes to that basic choice."
32
Indeed, in NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co., the United States
Supreme Court directed the NLRB to apply its rules concerning
representation elections in a neutral manner.3 3 The Savair Court considered
whether a union's practice of waiving initiation fees for all employees who
signed authorization cards violated the Act.34 The NLRB had determined
that such a practice did not violate the Act because "it is completely
illogical to characterize as improper inducement or coercion to vote 'Yes' a
waiver of something that can be avoided simply by voting 'No.""' In
30. As noted above, the Act not only protects an employee's right to engage in
protected activities such as union organizing, but it also protects an employee's "right to
refrain from any or all of such activities .. " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) (emphasis added).
31. Charles C. Jackson & Jeffrey S. Heller, Promises and Grants of Benefits under the
National Labor Relations Act, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 53 (1982) (emphasis added); see also
Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation Campaigns,
72 YALE L.J. 1243, 1245-46 (1963). But cf Mark M. Hager, The Emperor's Clothes Are
Not Efficient: Posner's Jurisprudence of Class, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 7, 55 (1991) (suggesting
that employers should play no role in a "process purporting to promote the best interests of
workers"); Elizabeth J. Masson, Note, "Captive Audience" Meetings in Union Organizing
Campaigns: Free Speech or Unfair Advantage, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 169, 180-81 (2004) ("The
NLRA was intended to enable workers to obtain power so that respect for their rights and
interests was not dependent solely on the interests of the employers or the state.").
32. John W. Teeter, Keeping the Faith: The Problem of Apparent Bias in Labor
Representation Elections, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 909, 910 (1990) (emphasis added); see also
Alexia M. Kulwiec, "On the Road Again" (to Organizing): Dana Corp., Metaldyne Corp.,
and the Board's Attack on Voluntary Recognition Agreements, 21 LAB. LAW. 37, 50 (2005)
("The goal of NLRB elections [is] to permit employees to choose their bargaining
representatives, if any, in so-called laboratory conditions .... ) (emphasis added).
33. 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
34. Id. at 272-73.
35. Id. at 275-76. It is interesting, to say the least, to compare the Board's reasoning
sanctioning the union's conduct in Savair with its reasoning, as set forth above, in the cases
finding employer promises to be coercive.
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rejecting the Board's reasoning, the Court noted the neutrality of the
NLRA, finding that "[a]ny procedure requiring a fair' election must
honor the right of those who oppose a union as well as those who favor
it."'3 6  The Court concluded with an explicit directive to the NLRB to
safeguard freedom of choice during union representation campaigns: "The
Board in its supervision of union elections may not sanction procedures
that cast their weight for the choice of a union and against a nonunion shop
or for a nonunion shop and against a union."37  In fact, the Board has
recognized its duty to safeguard neutrality and freedom of choice on
numerous occasions: "An election can serve its true purpose only if the
surrounding conditions enable employees to register a free and
untrammelled choice for or against a bargaining representative.' 38
Thus, the Board's distinction between the lawfulness of employer and
union promises during union representation campaigns must be evaluated
against the backdrop of the Act's twin concerns of supporting employee
freedom of choice and safeguarding the neutrality of the election process.
B. Employer Promises: Coercion or Persuasion ?39
Despite the Supreme Court's conclusion to the contrary in Exchange
Parts, there is very little evidence to support a blanket assertion that all
employer promises during union representation campaigns are inherently
coercive. Indeed, if a union promise to employees is merely free speech,
then why should an employer promise automatically be regarded as the
proverbial "fist inside the velvet glove?'4°  In distinguishing between
whether promises amount to persuasion or coercion, it is perhaps
appropriate to start with the definition of both terms. According to
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, the word "coerce" has three
meanings:4' "(1) to restrain or dominate by force;" "(2) to compel to an act
36. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 280.
38. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948). In General Shoe, the Board
established a "laboratory conditions" standard for union representation elections,
determining that certain campaign conduct warranted setting aside a union election even if
the conduct in and of itself did not constitute an unfair labor practice. Id. at 127.
39. Judge Wisdom addressed the difference between coercion and persuasion in the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Exchange Parts, which the Supreme Court ultimately overturned:
"It is good, homey, country-lawyer advocacy to argue that a carrot on a stick may have the
same effect on a donkey as a club. But a carrot is not a club. Labor is not a donkey.
Persuasion is not coercion." NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 304 F.2d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
40. NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
41. WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 256 (9th ed. 1990).
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or choice;" or "(3) to enforce or bring about by force or threat.
42 The act
of persuasion has two definitions: "(1) to move by argument, entreaty, or
expostulation to a belief, position or course of action;" or "(2) to plead
with. 
43
So, in comparing these definitions, the question becomes whether
employer promises during a union representation campaign restrain
employee freedom of choice by nullifying employee free will, or whether
they move employees to a course of action (a "no" vote) through argument
or entreaty. Given that employer promises during a campaign do not
involve any overt force, threat, or other act of compulsion, 44 they more
clearly fit the definition of persuasion. More importantly, there does not
appear to be any legitimate reason to find that an employer's promise
interferes with the exercise of employee free choice any more than a
promise made by a union during an organizing campaign.
Commentator Barbara Anderson's analysis of the differences between
coercion and persuasion in the secondary boycott context supports the
conclusion that employer promises are not inherently coercive.45  Ms.
Anderson wrote:
To be protected under the first amendment, the boycott
advocates' appeal to their listeners must be persuasive rather than
coercive. The distinction is crucial. Persuasive speech has
always been accorded the highest first amendment protection on
the theory that the free flow of ideas is central to our democratic
system of government: "the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
By contrast, speech that deprives its listeners of freedom of
choice, i.e., coercive speech, distorts the marketplace of ideas by
causing listeners to accept an idea not for its "truth" but to avoid
some sanction....
... Because the degree of any infringement of an actor's free
will is necessarily measured against the base line of the actor's
rights and privileges under the law, it is not surprising to find that
conduct is usually considered coercive, and the listener's free
will infringed, only after a court has concluded that the listener
42. Id. at 878 (defining "persuade"). Likewise, the Barron's Law Dictionary definition
of coercion includes the following: "Any form of compulsion or constraint which compels
or induces a person to act otherwise than freely; it may be physical force but is more often
used to describe any pressure which is brought to bear on another's free will." BARRON'S
LAW DICTIONARY 85 (5th ed. 2003).
43. WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 878 (9th ed. 1990).
44. Such conduct would clearly constitute unfair labor practices under the Act. 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting employers from interfering, restraining, or coercing
employees).
45. Barbara J. Anderson, Comment, Secondary Boycotts and the First Amendment, 51
U. CHI. L. REv. 811 (1984).
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has a legally protectible interest in avoiding the consequences
threatened by the "coercing "party.46
As employer promises during union representation campaigns do not
involve any overt threat impinging on a legally-protected interest of an
employee, it follows that a rule assuming that in all cases and situations
employers' promises are threatening or coercive to employees cannot be
supported under the normal definition of legal coercion. 47  Rather, in
appealing to employees to decide to vote against a union because of
promised improvements to the employees' terms and conditions of
employment, employers would seek to move employees by appealing to
their economic self-interest-the precise definition of persuasion-not
coercion.
The inherent fallacy of a rule that presumes coercion for every
employer promise was noted by commentators Charles Jackson and Jeffrey
Heller as long ago as 1982.48 Messrs. Jackson and Heller argue
persuasively that the underlying assumption behind the Exchange Parts
decision is wrong, and that a party challenging the results of a
representation election should have to produce evidence of actual employee
coercion before an election is overturned based on an employer promise:
49
We propose, therefore, making a simple, almost surgical change
in promises and grants law: eliminating the Exchange Parts
presumption of inherent coercion. Facially beneficial or benign
acts such as wage increases should be held unlawful only if the
General Counsel proves by objective evidence that the promise or
grant actually coerced employees in the sense that they suffered a
threat to job security or a diminution in other employment
benefits, or that the employer violated an independent policy
prohibited by the NLRA. °
Messrs. Jackson and Heller also note one of the perverse results of the
Exchange Parts rule. In a system designed to advance the freedom of
choice of employees, treating employer and union promises differently
46. Id. at 825-26 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
47. And, a rule that presumes that all promises made by a union during an organizing
campaign concerning how the union can improve the terms and conditions of employment
for employees through collective bargaining contain no elements of coercion is equally
indefensible. Indeed, promises made by a union representative may cause employees to feel
that if they do not vote for and openly support a union then they will be left behind and their
interests will not be equally represented if the union wins the election.
48. Jackson & Heller, supra note 31.
49. See James A. Campbell, Newdow Calls for a New Day in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence: Justice Thomas's "Actual Legal Coercion" Standard Provides the
Necessary Renovation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 541 (2006) (discussing "actual legal coercion" in
the context of establishment clause violations).
50. Jackson & Heller, supra note 31, at 58-59 (citations omitted).
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works to undermine employees' ability to make an informed choice: "If
the employer or union has something tangible to offer, it should be
disclosed before the election is held. Employee choice is enhanced to the
degree all the benefits from voting for or against the union are disclosed."
'"'
Put simply, advising employees of the potential consequences of a
vote for an employer is no more coercive than a union's attempt to
persuade employees by promising improvements to the terms and
conditions of employment as the result of unionization.
52 With all the cards
on the table, employees are in a position to make a better and more
informed decision concerning their economic self-interest and their interest
in having a union represent them in their working life.
53
The fallacy that all employer promises are inherently coercive has
been noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. In Skyline Distributors, Inc. v. NLRB,
5 4 the court
considered whether an employer's grant of benefits during a union
representation campaign warranted an order requiring the employer to
bargain with the union.55 The employer in Skyline had improperly applied
a wage freeze to maintenance employees that had not been intended to be
applied to that group.5 6 Following complaints about the application of the
wage freeze to the maintenance employees, management met and agreed
51. Id. at 56.
52. For a contrary view, see Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation
Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 363 (1995)
(discussing and ultimately disagreeing with research suggesting that employer promises of
benefits and other campaign speech seldom influence voters in representation elections).
53. It could be argued that because employer promises are not enforceable, employees
may be tricked into voting against a union in the hope that the employer will provide certain
improvements that never materialize after a union defeat in an election. This is not a
significant concern for several reasons. First, this concern applies equally to union
promises, which often never materialize, despite union claims during representation
campaigns. Second, if an employer breaks its promise, then the employees are clearly in a
position to know who can be trusted the next time a campaign arises. Such information
ultimately will allow employees to make a more informed choice with respect to union
representation. Finally, unions likely will inform employees during representation
campaigns that employer promises are not binding and can be taken away, and that
employees need a union to make sure promises are not broken. But see Jonathan P. Hiatt &
Craig Becker, Drift and Division on the Clinton NLRB, 16 LAB. LAW. 103, 116 (2000)
(arguing that the employer's ability to give captive audience speeches makes any employer
speech inherently coercive); Masson, supra note 31, at 190 (arguing that employer captive
audience speeches should be banned because they are inconsistent "with the democratic
ideals embodied in the National Labor Relations Act").
54. 99 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
55. Id. at 403-05. In certain instances, after a finding that an employer has committed
egregiously unfair labor practices, the NLRB will order the employer to bargain with a
union even in the absence of the union winning a Board-conducted election. NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
56. Skyline Distribs., 99 F.3d at 405.
PROMISES, PROMISES
that the wage freeze was not meant to be applied to that particular group of
employees and, thus, decided that the freeze should be rescinded."
Unaware of management's decision to rescind the wage freeze and
unhappy about its application to their work group, the maintenance
employees contacted a union to inquire about potential representation. 58
During a meeting with representatives of the union, a majority of the
maintenance employees signed union authorization cards.59 The union then
presented the cards to the employer and requested voluntary recognition.6"
Confronted with the demand for recognition, the employer informed the
employees that it already had decided to lift the wage freeze. 6' Thereafter,
management officials held another meeting with the maintenance group
during which employees complained about the company's wage scale.62
Subsequently, the company announced that it would adopt a new wage
scale for the maintenance employees.63  The union challenged the
employer's grant of benefits to employees by filing an unfair labor practice
charge.64
The Board acknowledged that the employer had decided to lift the
wage freeze before the onset of the union campaign. 65 However, the Board
found the timing of the announcement of the removal of the wage freeze
(after the institution of the union representation campaign) to be unlawful,
as was the employer's decision to "entice" employees with a promise of a
new wage scale.66 Based on these unfair labor practice findings, the Board
"issued a Gissel-style bargaining order," requiring the employer to bargain
with the union even in the absence of a union victory in an election.67 On
appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit, the court discussed at length the
propriety of the Exchange Parts rule forbidding employer promises during
union representation campaigns.68 While noting that it was bound by the
Exchange Parts prohibition on employer promises, the court concluded that
such a rule made little sense:
Although the Board's finding of an [unfair labor practice]
must be sustained, it cannot be gainsaid that this finding stands
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. As set forth in note 1, supra, under the proposed Employee Free Choice Act, the
union's actions may have been sufficient to require the employer to represent the
employees.
61. Skyline Distribs., 99 F.3d at 405-06.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 406.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 407-10.
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on a shaky foundation. The [Administrative Law Judge ("AL")]
found that [the employer's] officials made the decision to lift the
wage freeze before there was any indication that the maintenance
employees were considering a union. In other words, the
decision to lift the freeze was not designed to influence any
workers against joining a union. The problem, according to the
ALJ, arose when company officials decided to announce the
lifting of the freeze and the accompanying wage increase shortly
after learning about the employees' interest in the union....
There are many ironies here. Exchange Parts suggests that
employees like those at [this employer] are threatened by "a fist
inside the velvet glove" upon receiving benefits that they
demand. This is a counterintuitive notion. In support of its
principal premise, Exchange Parts says that employees never
"miss the inference that the source of benefits . . . conferred is
also the source from which future benefits must flow and which
may dry up if it is not obliged." Some scholars have effectively
responded, "So what?" This skeptical reaction to Exchange
Parts is better understood if one thinks hard about the situation in
this case. In reality, the maintenance employees at [the
employer] were playing an age-old game, attempting to threaten
management with a union to induce the grant of benefits. Their
threat succeeded, because the employees got exactly what they
wanted, with no acts of reprisal or other adverse actions taken
against them. The employees played their cards well: they knew
that, even after getting their wage increase and other benefits,
they still could have demanded a representation election and
voted for a union; and they knew that if the employer was foolish
enough to withdraw the grant of benefits, the union could have
been recalled. This hardly looks like a situation in which
employees were intimidated by the figurative "fist inside the
velvet glove."69
The Skyline case demonstrates the fallacy of the Exchange Parts rule
and the Board cases distinguishing between employer and union
promises.7 ° In a system designed to protect employee freedom of choice
and neutrality in representation decisions, these rules do nothing more than
limit employees' ability to make a reasoned and well-informed decision.
Meanwhile, the rules also clearly provide unions with an advantage of
69. Id. at 407-09 (citations omitted). The court went on to discuss some of the legal
scholarship and research that has criticized the Exchange Parts rule. Id. at 410-11.
70. For a sharp criticism of the Board's rules governing employer decisions to
implement (or not) wage increases during union representation campaigns, see Perdue
Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 144 F.3d 830, 839-41 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (dissenting opinion) ("When a
traffic light simultaneously blinks 'Stop' and 'Go' everyone knows repairs are needed.").
PROMISES, PROMISES
convincing employees of what is in their economic self-interest]' After all,
the union's decision to file an unfair labor practice charge demonstrates
clearly that the employer's actions were sufficient to convince employees
that a union was not necessary-a clear statement that the employees had
exercised their freedom of choice based upon an assessment (and ultimate
acceptance) of the employer's promises.
The fine distinction between coercion and persuasion is not unique to
the Board's prohibition on employer promises. In various other contexts,
the NLRB has often held that persuasion is not coercion. That is, speech
designed to influence a party is not equivalent to coercion.12 Indeed, when
struggling with such questions, the Board has often come down in favor of
balancing tests rather than blanket findings of coercion. For example, in
International Union, United Mine Workers ofAmerica, and District 29 and
New Beckley Mining Corp. 7 the Board considered an Administrative Law
Judge's decision that a middle-of-the-night mass rally of striking union
members and their supporters in the parking lot of a motel where strike
replacement workers were staying violated the secondary boycott
provisions of the NLRA.74 During this impromptu rally, between 50 and
140 persons gathered in the parking lot and, among other things, called the
motel guests "scabs," encouraged them to go home, and asked the motel
manager if he knew that the replacement workers should not be staying at
the establishment. 75 The Administrative Law Judge found that such actions
did not violate the NLRA since the demonstration "was intended only to
demonstrate [the union's] displeasure with replacement workers, and to
persuade them not to report to work at [the mine]. 76 In so holding, the
Administrative Law Judge concluded that the actions were not to threaten,
coerce or restrain anyone within the meaning of the Act, but rather only "to
communicate with the strikebreakers ....
The NLRB reversed the Administrative Law Judge's decision, finding
that the union's actions did violate the secondary boycott provisions of the
71. Indeed, in rejecting the remedy of a Gissel-style bargaining order in Skyline, the
court emphasized the importance of employee freedom of choice in union representation
elections. See Skyline Distribs, 99 F.3d at 411 ("[T]he Board's bargaining order cannot be
enforced in this case because the Board has given no credence whatsoever to employee 'free
choice."').
72. For an interesting discussion of the history of attempts to distinguish speech and
conduct in the labor law context, see Ken I. Kersch, How Conduct Became Speech and
Speech Became Conduct: A Political Development Case Study in Labor Law and the
Freedom of Speech, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 255 (2006).
73. 304 N.L.R.B. 71(1991).
74. Id. at 75-77.
75. Id. at 71-72.
76. Id. at 77 (citation omitted).
77. Id.
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Act.7" Specifically, the NLRB found that the activities in question strayed
beyond the boundaries of mere speech and, instead, constituted picketing, a
coercive activity that involves elements of both speech and conduct.
7 9
Thus, given the existence of an unlawful secondary motive, the NLRB
found that the New Beckley union's conduct violated the Act. ° More
recently, the NLRB's General Counsel has used New Beckley Mining to
argue that conduct joined with speech generally is necessary to establish a
finding of coercion:
All this activity is analogous to the mass gathering or coercive
blocking and interference with the neutral employers' business
found unlawful in New Beckley Mining. Such activity is not the
persuasive 'communication' protected by DeBartolo.s
Therefore, we conclude that the demonstrators used unprotected
coercion, rather than protected persuasion, to achieve their
goals.82
Accordingly, unlike the blanket assumption of coercion in the context
of employer promises during representation campaigns, in other contexts
the Board analyzes the speech more closely, looking for threatening or
coercive conduct joined with the challenged speech.
In short, there is very little support for a generalized finding that every
employer promise during a union representation campaign constitutes
coercion that violates the Act. Some employer promises, like union
promises, merely persuade employees to vote against a union because they
convince employees that such a pro-union decision is not in their economic
self-interest. Ultimately, such a decision is the essence of the exercise of
employee free choice.
C. Unraveling the Purported Rationale Supporting a Distinction between
Employer and Union Promises in Representation Campaigns-The
Value of Experience and Information in Evaluating Campaign
Promises
Viewed through the twin lenses of neutrality and employee freedom of
choice, the reasoning behind the distinction between employer and union
promises during representation campaigns simply does not withstand
78. Id. at 72.
79. Id. at 73-74.
80. Id.
81. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568 (1988) (holding that a union's distribution of handbills at a shopping mall's
entrance encouraging shoppers to forego their shopping until the mall's owner paid fair
wages to construction contractors did not violate the NLRA).
82. 2000 N.L.R.B. G.C.M. LEXIS 66, at *6 (July 18, 2000).
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scrutiny. As set forth above, that distinction would prevent an employer
from promising improvements to wages and benefits for employees, while
allowing unions to engage in the very same activity. The Board's rationale
for deciding that a union's promise is less problematic because employees
recognize that the union does not have the ability to deliver on its promises
makes no sense for a variety of reasons.
Allowing unions to make promises during a campaign because
employees presumably understand that such promises cannot be guaranteed
through the process of collective bargaining ignores perhaps the most basic
and fundamental characteristic of a union-organizing campaign. That is,
employees know and have experience with their employer, while they do
not have the same type of relationship with the organizing union.83 Indeed,
in most instances, a union organizer attempting to convince employees that
unionization is in their best interest generally is not an employee at all, but
an outsider who has no relationship or experience with the proposed
bargaining unit.84 Thus, the Board's assumption about why union promises
are not damaging to employees overlooks the fact that employees have
little or no experience with the individual or entity making those promises.
In such circumstances, employees are much less able to assess what is a
meaningful promise and what is not. Employees simply have no
experience or information that would assist them in evaluating a promise
made by a union. Thus, in contrast to the Board's reasoning, the lack of
information about the entity or individual making the promises to
employees makes such union promises much more likely to mislead or
deceive an employee than an employer promise would.
Likewise, employees in a union campaign often have little or no
information about the process of collective bargaining and what it means
for a union to make promises about the results of collective bargaining.85
As noted above, the percentage of unionized employees, particularly in the
private sector over which the NLRB has jurisdiction, has dwindled to the
point that less than 10% of the private-sector workforce is currently
83. Presumably, that experience is often what led the employees to initiate an
organizing campaign in the first place.
84. Many union organizers are outgoing individuals who are skilled at making strangers
feel comfortable in almost any setting, including parking lots, bars, churches and
employees' living rooms. See DONALD P. WILSON, TOTAL VICTORY! 134-35 (1997).
85. This lack of information is the reason why employers generally attempt to educate
employees about the process of collective bargaining during representation campaigns.
Employees simply have no idea what the process involves when union representatives speak
to them about the purported benefits the union will bring to the employees' workplace. See,
e.g., LEWIS, supra note 29, at 190-92 (setting forth a hypothetical agenda for a management
presentation on the respective powers of unions and management in negotiations).
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unionized.8 6  Clearly, labor markets and the American workforce have
moved away from unionization and collective bargaining.87 Given that
fact, it seems presumptuous, if not downright inaccurate, for the NLRB to
assert that employees have sufficient experience and knowledge to allow
them to ascertain that union promises about the results of collective
bargaining are nothing more than speculative assertions designed to
influence their votes. Employees simply do not have sufficient information
or experience to allow them to consistently recognize that union promises
are essentially meaningless.
Contrast the information available to employees about union promises
and union organizers with the information and experience that employees
possess about their employers. Employees know their supervisors and
managers and have dealt with them over a long period of time. Employer
promises have been made and evaluated before and employees can
compare what is said in a campaign with what has happened over time.
Thus, employees are in a much better position to be able to recognize
empty campaign rhetoric when it comes from an employer. They also are
more equipped to recognize what constitutes meaningful change on the
employer's part and what does not. For example, if an employer makes
promises about new employee pension benefits, the employee can assess
whether the benefits currently provided have been acceptable, whether the
employer has made promises about such benefits in the past, whether the
employer has lived up to those promises, and the employer's overall record
in dealing with problems or issues once they have been identified. Such
86. See Hogler, supra note 3 (noting that, by 2004, unions represented only 7.9% of the
private sector workforce and only 12.5% of the non-agricultural workforce overall).
According to the United States Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
overall percentage of the American workforce that was unionized in 2006 fell to just 12%.
Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2006 (Jan. 25, 2007),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. In the private sector, just
7.4% of the workforce was unionized in 2006. Id. And since 1983, overall union
membership in the American workforce has been on a steady decline. Id.
87. Indeed, the economy has moved away from traditional union strongholds such as
manufacturing and moved towards less traditional union workplaces, such as the service
sector. See generally Charles B. Craver, The Labor Movement Needs a Twenty-First
Century Committee for Industrial Organization, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 69, 69 (2006)
("The American labor movement is in a moribund state."); Michael H. Gottesman, In
Despair, Starting Over: Imagining A Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 59, 64-65 (1993) (suggesting that decline in labor unions has resulted in part from
decline in traditional unionized industries); Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor
Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 2767, 2799 (1991) (same).
Unions, with mixed success, have attempted to deal with these changes to the economy by
seeking to organize in non-traditional workplaces. See, e.g., Sheldon D. Pollack & Daniel
V. Johns, Graduate Students, Unions, and Brown University, 20 LAB. LAW. 243 (2004)
(discussing current state of law with respect to attempts to unionize graduate students at
private universities).
PROMISES, PROMISES
information allows employees to make an educated choice about whether
an employer promise of benefits during a campaign should influence their
votes.88 By contrast, an employee has no such information or experience
that would allow an educated assessment of a union's promise to sweeten
pension benefits as the result of collective bargaining.89
A rule that allows promises made by the entity with which employees
have little or no experience and prohibits promises from the organization
with which employees have a mountain of experience simply makes no
sense. If employees can be misled or unfairly influenced by employer
promises during a campaign, then that concern is even more acute where
the person or entity making the promises is a relative stranger with no track
record or history on which such promises can be judged.
D. Promises and Informed Employee Decision-Making
In a system designed to favor employee freedom of choice and
neutrality, it is unfair to allow one side to make promises about what a
victory in an election will bring, while not allowing the other side to do the
same. After all, union representation decisions hinge on whether or not an
employee believes that being represented by a union will be more
beneficial than remaining non-union. In that context, any restriction on the
amount of information provided to employees about the consequences of
their decision is problematic.9" The value of such information allows a
more educated choice:
88. For a discussion of the value of providing information to employees about potential
health and environmental hazards in the workplace, see Matthew F. Weil, Comment,
Protecting Employees' Fetuses from Workplace Hazards: Johnson Controls Narrows the
Options, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 142, 178 (1993) (discussing importance of
providing information to employees concerning potential fetal hazards in the workplace in
order to promote informed employee decision-making about jobs).
89. For example, with little or no experience about the union available to employees,
how is an employee supposed to evaluate a promise such as the one made by the union in
Lalique N.A., Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 1119 (2003) (promising immediate, free medical benefits
to employees if elected)?
90. In almost every other context, legislators, courts and administrative agencies favor
providing as much information as possible to employees about their respective rights and
entitlements. See, e.g., the notice requirements contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000) (mandating that written notice of minimum wage provisions be
provided to employees before start of employment); the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 627 (2000) (requiring conspicuous posting of information deemed
appropriate by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (2000) (specifying the manner for promulgation of
occupational safety and health standards); the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29
U.S.C. § 2003 (2000) (mandating conspicuous posting of pertinent provisions); the Family
and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2619 (2000) (same); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (2000) (requiring that employers post official summaries of
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Union organizing campaigns often consist of heated battles
between employers and bargaining representatives.
Embellishments, harsh words, and extreme charges commonly
characterize the atmosphere prior to a Board representation
election. Rather than policing or censoring this propaganda, the
Board and courts recognize that the liberty to speak for a specific
cause in the organizational context goes to the heart of the contest
over whether an employee chooses to be represented or not.
Because it is the employee's ultimate decision as to which
position to support, the Court has decided that the employee
should make an educated choice after sifting through the free
flow of information.9'
This point is illustrated by the following scenario. A union organizing
drive begins at a plant that is faced with mounting health care costs. The
employees are unhappy about the health insurance plans offered and the
monthly cost to members. A union organizer tells the employees that if the
union is voted in, they will ensure that employees are offered the
opportunity to participate in the union's health and welfare fund-a fund
that has better coverage at no cost to the employee. The employer,
surprised by the union organizing drive and the employee concerns behind
it, is willing to change the health plan and take on more of the cost of
health insurance to deal with the employees' concerns. These changes
would be sufficient to convince the employees that a union is unnecessary.
Indeed, the employees would rather have these changes made than take on
the expense of union dues.
In this scenario, however, the employer is constrained from explaining
how it would deal with the issue raised by the employees that resulted in
the organizing campaign. While the union freely promises sweeping new
benefits and cuts in health care costs, the employer is resigned to give
merely vague assurances that it will work with employees to address their
pertinent provisions of the act); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12115
(2000) (requiring posting of notices explaining relevant provisions). At least one
commentator has proposed that the NLRB adopt a rule requiring that a notice be posted in
workplaces that outlines employees' ights under the NLRA. See Peter D. DeChiara, The
Right to Know: An Argument for Informing Employees of Their Rights under the National
Labor Relations Act, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431 (1995).
91. Stephen F. Befort & Bryan N. Smith, At the Cutting Edge of Labor Law
Preemption: A Critique of Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 20 LAB. LAW. 107, 126
(2004) (citations omitted). Presumably, it would be better for employees if the "free flow of
information" in a representation campaign involved clear statements about the consequences
of a "no" vote, as opposed to vague employer assurances and other campaign rhetoric
suggesting with little amplification that the employer understands the employees' concerns
and will address them when and if the union loses the election. See, e.g., WILSON, supra
note 84, at 318-19 (providing sample language for management in encouraging "no" vote
reminding employees that all power to change compensation and benefits rests with the
employer).
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issues. 92 Does such a situation really favor informed employee choice? Do
employees make a more informed choice while only hearing the promises
of the union? The answer to these questions is clearly no. Employee free
choice in an election is not supported by allowing one side of an election to
make promises while covering the mouth of the other side. 93 Nor does this
rule support the principle of neutrality in employee decision-making during
union elections. As noted by one commentator:
Employers may not ... promise special benefits in the event of a
union election or defeat, even though a more lenient attitude
prevails as to union promises. In these asymmetric restrictions
on employers, the law does more than champion the rights of an
informed electorate of independent decisionmakers. It actually
favors the formation of unions .... "
In advocating a relaxation of the NLRB's prohibition on union
conferral of benefits on employees during organizing campaigns, Professor
Catherine L. Fisk's argument clearly provides support for the analogous
conclusion that unconditional employer promises of benefits during
organizing campaigns should be permitted:
The second rationale for prohibiting the conferral of benefits
[during organizing campaigns] is that an employee choice should
be reasoned as well as free. An employee who votes for or
against a union because he or she has been promised or given
money may be exercising a free choice, just one that is more
directly affected by economic concerns than the Board and the
courts consider seemly. Of course, all union elections are
affected in part by the employees' perception of what is going to
be in their economic best interest-will unionization lead to
higher wages and better working conditions or not? As one court
had noted, however, employees should choose unionization based
92. An employer likely will also follow such vague assurances with attacks on the
credibility of the union and its purported inability to deliver on its promises, as well as
ominous statements regarding the uncertainty of the process of collective bargaining. See,
e.g., LEWIS, supra Note 29, at 188, 192 (sample handout proclaiming that there are no
guarantees once negotiations begin and significant downside); WILSON, supra note 84, at
163 (poster emphasizing the downside risks inherent in collective bargaining); Lalique N.A.,
Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 1119 (describing leaflet from employer to employees, emphasizing that
health care benefits will not follow election victory for union, but rather will require further
bargaining).
93. As discussed in note 28, supra, there may be an argument that allowing employees
to enjoy the results of the union organizing drive-better health care benefits-without
having to pay the cost to get those benefits (i.e., union dues) creates a classic economic free-
rider situation. However, in a system designed to protect the rights of employees, not
necessarily unions, such a problem does not constitute a serious concern under the Act.
94. Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REv. 991, 1015
(1986) (citations omitted).
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on a reasoned "consideration of the advantages and
disadvantages of unionization in his or her work environment"
and not "any extraneous inducements of pecuniary value." Thus,
the prohibition is on extraneous economic inducements, not on
voting one's own pocketbook interests. In more recent cases, the
NLRB has elaborated on this notion, asserting that expenditures
that a union or employer make that are germane to the issues
(wages and working conditions) are permissible because they
appeal to employees' reasoned vision of their economic self-
interest; gifts of money or things are impermissible because they
are not germane to the issues of wages and working conditions.95
If, as Professor Fisk argues, promises that appeal to employee
concerns about their own economic self-interest are permissible on the
union side, then there is little justification why similar employer promises
are forbidden. Indeed, a prohibition on employer promises undercuts
employees' ability to make a reasoned decision about what is in their self-
interest; it limits the relevant information available to employees about the
consequences of a "no" vote.96
Similarly, in arguing for lifting the ban on union grants of benefits
during representation campaigns, Professor Michael J. Hayes actually
supports, albeit unintentionally, the conclusion that providing employees
with as much information as possible about the consequences of their
decision with respect to union representation, including employer promises,
is the correct result.97 Professor Hayes criticizes case law appearing to
prohibit union grants of benefits outside the so-called "sphere or [sic]
relevance"-i.e., unrelated to employees' terms and conditions of
employment.98 The crux of Professor Hayes' argument appears to be that
such a rule "erroneously disregards a major dimension of the relationship
between unions and employees." 99 Thus, a rule prohibiting union grants of
benefits outside employees' immediate terms and conditions of
employment actually inhibits free choice because it limits the information
available to employees about the potential benefits of unions and
unionization:
Thus, contrary to the assertion that union benefit grants "pervert
the employees' free choice," it is the prohibition on benefit grants
that interferes with choice. The prohibition artificially minimizes
95. Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 57, 68-69 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting NLRB v. L & J Equip. Co., 745 F.2d
224, 231 (3d Cir. 1984)).
96. Id.; see also supra discussion accompanying note 53.
97. Michael J. Hayes, Let Unions Be Unions: Allowing Grants of Benefits During
Representation Campaigns, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 259 (2003).
98. Id. at 280-81.
99. Id. at 281.
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the experience employees can have of union assistance and thus
skews employees' perceptions of how a union can benefit
them.'00
Professor Hayes then quotes Justice Byron White's similar assertion in the
Savair case: "[R]estrictions on the communications of the union as to
potential benefits may unduly prevent the intelligent exercise of such
choice."10'
Of course, immediately following this discussion, Professor Hayes
attempts to justify why his compelling argument should not also be applied
with equal force to employer promises.10 2 The crux of his distinction
basically is an unsupported reliance on the court's conclusion in Exchange
Parts that employer promises somehow constitute "implied threat[s] to
employees."'' 3 Absent repeating the oft-cited Exchange Parts metaphor,
Professor Hayes does little to explain why such a conclusion is justified or
why there should be a blanket rule prohibiting employers from providing
employees with information that is clearly relevant to the union
representation decision. This is contrary to his article's main premise,
promoting employees' freedom of choice."°4 Interestingly, Professor Hayes
acknowledges that unions, like employers, can abuse the use of employee
promises during representation campaigns: "Although unions could also
trick employees by granting them benefits before an election and retracting
them after the union wins the election, unions have greater disincentives to
do that than employers do."'' 0 5 Put simply, unsupported assumptions and
aged metaphors are insufficient to justify a rule violating the goal of
neutrality and limiting employees' freedom of choice--employer promises
are no more damaging than union promises to employees during
representation campaigns.
As noted by Professor Hayes, in certain contexts, the Board has found
that union promises during representation campaigns are unlawful.
However, unlike its treatment of employer promises, the Board has done so
only in the somewhat unusual circumstance where a union has made
promises to employees that are unrelated to the collective bargaining
process. For example, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., the Board
invalidated an election where a union promised employees favorable job
100. Id. at 287 (citing NLRB v. Whitney Mus. of Am. Art, 636 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir.
1980)).
101. Id. (citing NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 285 n.4 (White, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added)).).
102. Id. at 293-95.
103. Id. at 294.
104. Id. at 293-98.
105. Id. at 297.
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referrals if they voted for the union. 116 If such promises are sufficient to set
aside an election, then the Board also should set aside elections where the
union makes promises concerning purported improvements that they can
make to terms and conditions of employment as a result of collective
bargaining.0 7 After all, the purpose of union representation elections is
deciding whether the union can improve the terms and conditions of
employment. 0 8 Thus, the NLRB's jurisprudence has the perverse effect of
allowing union promises about the potential "gains" of collective
bargaining, prohibiting similar promises by employers, and prohibiting
union promises about extraneous matters that have little or nothing to do
with how or why employees typically vote in representation elections. Put
simply, these rules make no sense. 109
IV. CONCLUSION
If neutrality and freedom of choice are the twin goals of the NLRB's
regulation of union representation elections, then the current rules
governing campaigns-which prohibit employer promises during union
campaigns, while allowing union promises-simply make no sense. There
is little or no evidence supporting a blanket and unequivocal assumption
that all employer promises are inherently coercive and should be
prohibited. Moreover, it is quite possible that union promises to employees
about the collective bargaining results that the union will purportedly
achieve are more problematic for employees than employer promises.
Indeed, in most instances, employees have no experience with the
promising union or its representatives and may have little or no
understanding about the process of collective bargaining. Employees will
thus have very little ability to separate the wheat from the chaff in assessing
such promises.
106. 261 N.L.R.B. 125, 127 (1982). The Board, however, has not been as consistent in
invalidating elections based on similar union promises. See NLRB v. L & J Equip. Co., 745
F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1984) (accepting NLRB's finding that union campaign promises to
provide free dinner and victory dance was not objectionable and did not warrant setting
aside election results).
107. See supra notes 23 and 27 and accompanying discussion.
108. In a union representation election, the employees decide whether unionization
ultimately is in their economic self-interest.
109. Stated another way, the prohibition on employer promises should be repealed for
the simple reason that employees are not naive. They have the ability to assess employer
promises and recognize genuine change or empty rhetoric. Employees wade through
political promises nearly every year and are capable of doing the same in the workplace.
They know their employer, their managers, and their supervisors. They have the ability to
assess whether voting for the union is in their economic self-interest or not. Thus, any rule
limiting employee access to information about the consequences of their decision ultimately
impinges on employee freedom of choice.
PROMISES, PROMISES
In contrast to the lack of information available to employees with
respect to the promises made by unions during representation campaigns,
employees are in possession of a vast amount of information about their
respective employers. Employees are familiar with supervisors and
management, generally know the history of the employer's treatment of its
employees and, thus, have the information and experience that would allow
them to critically evaluate any promises made by the employer.
Accordingly, viewed from this perspective, the current legal prohibition on
employer promises during representation campaigns is backwards.
In any event, it is clear that any rule limiting the amount of
information available to employees about the economic consequences of a
"yes" or "no" vote in a union representation election impinges upon
employee freedom of choice and therefore corrodes the election process.
That concern is particularly acute where the rule imposes such a limitation
only on one side of the election. If the goal of the law is to allow
employees to decide through a neutral election process whether
unionization is in their best interest, then a rule which prevents employees
from learning how a "no" vote will improve (or not) the terms and
conditions of their employment cannot be reconciled with that goal.
Finally, as noted above, Congress is currently considering proposed
legislation that purportedly seeks to achieve "freedom of choice" in union
representation decisions. Such a goal is laudable."0 This Article does not
necessarily seek to allow all employer promises or grants of benefits in
representation campaigns, nor even to assert that such employer actions are
always acceptable and appropriate in union representation campaigns.
Rather, the purpose of this Article is merely to point out that the current
legal regulation of such promises is illogical and should be reexamined in
light of the goals of neutrality and employee freedom of choice in union
representation elections. While the Supreme Court's catchy and oft-
repeated metaphor of the "fist inside the velvet glove""' makes for a great
quote, it does not necessarily justify the current regulation of employer
promises during union representation campaigns or the distinctions that
have been drawn between employer and union promises.
110. This Article takes no position on the propriety of the Employee Free Choice Act.
Such legislation should be critically examined to determine whether it, in fact, furthers
employee freedom of choice or whether, instead, it merely constitutes a political gift to
unions. Unions, dismayed by the failure of their own message to convince employees of
their value (and hence stop the steady decline of unionization in the American workforce),
may be using this legislation to simply change the rules of the game to make organizing
efforts easier.
11. See supra note 16.
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